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BOOK REVIEWS
CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA
CONTROL. By DON R. LE Duc. Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1973. Pp. 289. $10.00.
JACOB W. MAYER*
No Homer has yet sung the Odyssey of the cable television indus-
try's efforts to achieve full acceptance by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC), the broadcast industry, and the Congress.
Perhaps because cable television is so recent a development that it
defies final analysis, Professor Le Duc's attempt does not succeed;
nevertheless, no future analyst will overlook this substantial contri-
bution to the literature of the field.
As did many other components of the present television broadcast
structure in the United States, cable television, formerly called
community antenna television (CATV), evolved from the television
freeze of 1948-1952.1 Commercial television broadcast operation had
begun in earnest after World War I and quickly had become ex-
tremely popular with the general public. Unfortunately, the engi-
neering assumptions that had been the basis for selecting station
locations soon proved too sanguine when operation began suffering
from more interference between stations than had been anticipated.
The Federal Communications Commission therefore imposed a
freeze upon further station authorizations until additional experi-
mentation could clarify the engineering problems, a process that
ultimately consumed four years and led to adoption of the Sixth
Report and Order which is still the basis of television allocations.
During the prolonged freeze, the general public's interest in re-
ceiving television in unserved and underserved areas encouraged the
development of a number of supplemental delivery systems, includ-
ing boosters, translators, and CATV systems.3 Early CATV's simply
* B.S., J.D., University of Kentucky; LL.M., George Washington University. Adjunct
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 1974-75.
1. See Botein, Comparative Broadcast Licensing Procedures and the Rule of Law: A Fuller
Investigation, 6 GA. L. Rv. 743, 750-52 (1972).
2. Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Sixth Report
and Order, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952).
3. Boosters and translators are types of small rebroadcast stations. Cf. 47 C.F.R. pt. 74
(1974).
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were antennas located at high elevations and connected by coaxial
cable with the homes of subscribers willing to pay a fee for the
service. CATV systems were welcomed by broadcasters who bene-
fited from the expanded coverage of their signals and who expected
that, with the expected lifting of the television freeze and conse-
quent expansion of broadcast service, the CATV's gradually would
be driven out of business.4
Following the freeze, however, CATV systems continued to pros-
per in outlying areas because of their ability to improve the quality
of signals and, in some cases, to provide additional service. As the
public demand for television service continued, CATV operators
began to import additional signals from distant stations by using
chains of microwave relay stations. This technological innovation
had far-reaching implications for broadcasters; whereas CATV's
previously had been little more than a superior form of antenna,
they now threatened broadcast stations, which would have to com-
pete with signals from distant stations.
The broadcasters perceived three different threats from the cable
industry. Operators tended to allocate the then very limited number
of channels to distant stations with the result that local stations
were cut off from their local viewers. 5 Moreover, even if the local
signal were carried on the cable, its audience might be diluted be-
cause its programs were duplicated by imported stations that view-
ers might prefer to watch. Finally, the public preference for im-
ported signals might "fragment" the local market to the detriment
of the local stations which otherwise would have a larger market
share.6
4. There was precedent for this expectation in that some antenna systems built in the
1920's to distribute radio signals had quickly gone bankrupt. Most of the exaggerated tales
of CATV profitability stem from the period of the freeze when operators typically charged
extremely high connection fees in order to recapture their capital investment as quickly as
possible before new broadcast stations went on the air.
5. Early CATV systems bad a capacity for only three to five television signals. Subsequent
technical development allowing the carriage of additional signals has mooted the problems
associated with preferential allocation by the CATV operators.
6. The offsetting consideration is that fragmentation also promotes the Commission's long-
standing goal of program diversity. Protection of broadcasters from adverse economic impact
is a delicate but important policy problem. Although the Commission has no obligation to
protect broadcasters from loss per se, it cannot refuse to consider evidence of economic losses
that might cause losses of program service to the public. See, e.g., Carroll Broadcasting v.
FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The problem is accentuated where CATV service might
drive broadcast service out of an area since that service could not be replaced economically
by CATV in areas of relatively low population density. Consequently, the ultimate nightmare
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Professor Le Duc ably describes the resulting confrontations be-
tween the broadcast industry and CATV operators, and it is un-
likely that future researchers will wish to expand upon his work. In
brief, broadcast opposition to further CATV development included
efforts to secure protective legislation, intervention by the Federal
Communications Commission, and protection by the courts on var-
ious suggested theories such as copyright. By the end of the 1950's
the CATV industry had rebuffed these challenges; Congress had not
acted, the Federal Communications Commission had not inter-
vened, and no judicial decisions favorable to the broadcasters had
been obtained. The seemingly decisive victories of the CATV indus-
try could not be sustained, however.
Instead, after legislative compromises had been rejected by the
CATV industry, the Federal Communications Commission was per-
suaded to adopt an increasingly interventionist role. In 1959, the
Commission had rejected the assertion of jurisdiction over CATV's.,
This policy weakened, however, when the Commission was per-
suaded to use its regulatory power over microwave relay stations to
protect television broadcast stations.8 By the beginning of 1966 the
Commission reacted to threatened CATV expansion in major televi-
sion markets by adopting the Second Report and Order9 in which it
asserted the right to regulate all CATV systems. Broadly speaking,
CATV systems were required to carry all local television signals and
to delete imported duplicative programs broadcast on the same day.
CATV expansion into smaller television markets was allowed on the
reasoning that stations in such markets would be network affiliates
and therefore largely protected by the nonduplication rules; expan-
sion into the nation's 100 largest television markets, however, which
contain approximately 90 percent of the population, was checked.
CATV operators who wished to carry imported signals into the latter
markets were required either to demonstrate in hearing that car-
riage of distant signals would not deter development of UHF televi-
sion"0 or to obtain a waiver of the hearing requirement." Although
is the situation in which CATV has destroyed the broadcast structure but cannot replace it.
7. Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV
"Satellite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of Television Broad-
casting, 26 F.C.C. 403, 424 (1959).
8. See Carter Mountain Transmission v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
9. Docket Nos. 14895, 15233, and 15971, Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
10. The UHF stations are considered more vulnerable to CATV competition since the fact
that they typically are not affiliated with a network would reduce the benefit to them of the
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implementation of the new rules initially bogged down in the Com-
mission's Broadcast Bureau, a "CATV Task Force" was formed by
the Commission and in operation by October.
Professor Le Duc completely discounts the significance of this
group both on the basis of its size and on the ground that it was
largely ineffective in disposing of requests for operation in the major
markets. He asserts that "the FCC by 1968 was buried under a
backlog of more than two hundred applications. Its entire list of top-
100 approvals consisted of four systems .... ,,12 Based on his per-
ception that the Commission did nothing to deal with its CATV
backlog, Professor Le Duc apparently accepts the thesis that the
Second Report and Order was never more than a concealed freeze.
He thus adopts the frequent charge of the CATV industry that there
is a structural bias in the Commission against the CATV industry.13
Professor Le Due's facts in this area are erroneous, h6wever, and
his conclusion therefore suspect. While the CATV Task Force's re-
sources never matched those of the Broadcast Bureau, it was sub-
stantially more productive than Professor Le Due acknowledges,"
and it ultimately was accepted by the CATV industry on this
basis. 5 Consequently, a more accurate appraisal of the Task Force,
and of the Commission's motives in this area, would seem to be that
it was intended to present the CATV industry's point of view before
the Commission and that it took reasonable steps to control its
nonduplication rule.
11. The Commission always retains the right to waive its rules. 47 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1974).
12. D. La Duc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC 158 (1973).
13. Id. at 21.
14. Regretably, several years after the fact, it is impossible to generate accurate figures in
this area. An indication that Professor Le Duc has understated the Task Force's production
is apparent from the first two FCC reporter volumes that would reflect the Task Force's work.
Just a cursory scanning reveals a number of actions, including several affecting major
markets: Mission Cable TV, Inc., 5 F.C.C.2d 575 (1966) (waiver granted to add signal on
existing system); Athens TV Cable Co., Inc., 5 F.C.C.2d 577 (1966) (waiver granted to add
signal on new system); Greater Television, 5 F.C.C.2d 699 (1966) (waiver granted for changes
on existing system); Stephen Vaughan & Assoc., 6 F.C.C.2d 291 (1966) (partial waiver to
allow interim operation); Gateway Cable TV, Inc., 6 F.C.C.2d 412 (1967) (waiver to add signal
on new system); Long Island Cablevision Corp., 6 F.C.C.2d 653 (1967) (waivers granted for
one new system and two existing systems); Unicable, Inc., 6 F.C.C.2d 771 (1967) (hearing
order which includes waiver for one new system and one existing system); American Televi-
sion Relay, Inc., 6 F.C.C.2d 837 (1967) (waiver for new system). Inasmuch as the most recent
of these actions was taken in February 1967, Professor Le Due's estimate of major market
production for the 1966-1968 period appears substantially short of reality.
15. Sol Shildhause and His CATV Task Force, TV COMMUNICATbONS, February 1967, at 32.
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backlog. The very existence of the Task Force also exerted some
pressure on the broadcast industry to negotiate.
Further expansion of the Commission's involvement in the cable
industry was delayed until the Supreme Court affirmed the Com-
mission's jurisdiction in June 1968.16 Shortly thereafter, the Su-
preme Court also held that CATV signal carriage did not constitute
a "performance" within the meaning of the Copyright Act.17 The
effect of these decisions was to recognize the Commission's regula-
tory jurisdiction just as the broadcast industry lost its most likely
source of leverage, copyright protection, for future negotiations. The
Commission's response, late in 1968, was largely to defer further
action in the cable field, pending resolution of some extremely wide-
ranging rulemaking inquiries.1 8 Eventually, a compromise between
the cable and the broadcast industries was embodied in the Cable
Television Report and Order of February 1972.19 Professor Le Duc
provides an interesting case study of negotiations between indus-
tries by fully describing the various stages of the rulemaking. It is
difficult to tell whether the broadcast-cable controversy has been
resolved finally, since the inflation of 1973-74 has largely inhibited
the development of new cable facilities designed for operation under
the new rules.
The strong points of Professor Le Duc's work lie in its wide-
ranging collection of reference sources and an attractive narrative
style which well describes a frequently chaotic situation. Its great
weakness, however, is its effort to document a thesis, that structural
bias in the Federal Communications Commission prevented quick
response to the regulatory demands of new technology, which does
not seem supported by the record.
16. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
17. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
18. Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. 18397,5 F.C.C.2d
417 (1968).
19. Docket Nos. 18397, 18397-A, 18373, 18416, 18892, and 18894, Cable Television Report
and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
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